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Abstract
This paper investigates how concentrated ownership of capital in￿ uences the pricing of
risky assets in a production economy. The model is designed to approximate the skewed
distribution of wealth and income in U.S. data. I show that concentrated ownership signif-
icantly magni￿es the equity risk premium relative to an otherwise similar representative-
agent economy because the capital owners￿consumption is more strongly linked to volatile
dividends from equity. A temporary shock to the technology for producing new capital (an
￿investment shock￿ ) causes dividend growth to be much more volatile than aggregate con-
sumption growth, as in long-run U.S. data. The investment shock can also be interpreted
as a depreciation shock, or more generally, a ￿nancial friction that a⁄ects the supply of new
capital. Under power utility with a risk aversion coe¢ cient of 3.5, the model can roughly
match the ￿rst and second moments of key asset pricing variables in long-run U.S. data,
including the historical equity risk premium. About one-half of the model equity premium
is attributable to the investment shock while the other half is attributable to a standard
productivity shock. On the macro side, the model performs reasonably well in matching
the business cycle moments of aggregate variables, including the pro-cyclical movement of
capital￿ s share of total income in U.S. data.
Keywords: Asset Pricing, Equity Premium, Term Premium, Investment Shocks, Real Busi-
ness Cycles, Wealth Inequality.
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1.1 Overview
The distribution of wealth in the U.S. economy is highly skewed. The top decile of U.S. house-
holds owns approximately 80 percent of ￿nancial wealth and about 70 percent of total wealth
including real estate.1 Shares of corporate stock are an important component of ￿nancial
wealth, representing claims to the physical capital of ￿rms. This paper investigates how con-
centrated ownership of capital in￿ uences the pricing of risky assets in a production economy.
I show that concentrated ownership signi￿cantly magni￿es the equity risk premium relative to
an otherwise similar representative-agent economy because the capital owners￿consumption
is more strongly linked to volatile dividends from equity.
The framework for the analysis is a real business cycle model with capital adjustment
costs and two types of stochastic shocks. In the baseline version of the model, the top decile of
agents in the economy owns 100 percent of the productive capital stock￿ a setup that roughly
approximates the skewed distribution of U.S. ￿nancial wealth. The consumption of the capital
owners is funded from dividends and wage income. The consumption of the remaining agents,
called workers, is funded only from wage income. Since workers do not save, all assets (equity
and bonds) are priced by the capital owners. The labor supply of capital owners and workers is
inelastic, consistent with the near-zero elasticity estimates obtained by most empirical studies.2
The ratio of the capital owners￿labor supply to the total labor supply is calibrated to match
the degree of income inequality in long-run U.S. data. When this ratio is equal to unity, the
model collapses to a representative-agent framework. A standard ￿productivity shock￿governs
labor-enhancing technological progress and is assumed to evolve as a random walk with drift.
A temporary but persistent ￿investment shock￿ impacts the technology for producing new
capital. This shock is intended to capture exogenous technological changes that in￿ uence the
relative contributions of new investment versus existing capital in the production of new capital
goods. Empirical studies by Fischer (2006), Justiniano and Primiceri (2006), and Justiniano,
et al. (2010) all suggest that shocks of this sort are an important source of macroeconomic
￿ uctuations. The investment shock that I consider can also be interpreted as a capital quality
shock or a depreciation shock that in￿ uences the economic value or obsolescence of existing
capital. Liu et al. (2010) ￿nd that depreciation shocks account for up to 30 percent of
output ￿ uctuations at business cycle frequencies. Greenwood et al. (1988) were among the
￿rst to consider an investment shock in a real business cycle framework. In their model, the
investment shock can in￿ uence the depreciation rate via variable capital utilization. More
generally, shocks that appear in the capital accumulation equation can be interpreted as a
1See Wol⁄ (2006), Table 4.2, p. 113.
2For an overview of the empirical estimates, see Blundell and McCurdy (1999). Allowing for elastic labor
supply on the part of workers would not change the model￿ s asset pricing results because workers do not
participate in ￿nancial markets.
1reduced-form way of capturing ￿nancial frictions that impact the supply of new capital.3
The standard deviation of the productivity shock innovation is calibrated so that the model
matches the volatility of real aggregate consumption growth in long-run U.S. data. The stan-
dard deviation of the investment shock innovation is calibrated so that the model matches
the volatility of real dividend growth in the data. Figure 1 shows that dividend growth is
about three times more volatile than aggregate consumption growth. While both series are
less volatile in the post-World War II period, it remains true that dividend growth is about
three times more volatile than consumption growth for the period 1947 to 200• 8. The model
also captures the empirical observation that the consumption growth of stockholders is more
volatile than that of non-stockholders, as documented recently by Malloy et al. (2009). Capital
owners in the model demand a high equity premium because they must bear a disproportionate
amount of aggregate consumption risk. In a representative-agent endowment economy with
iid consumption growth, the equity risk premium relative to one-period bonds is given by the
product of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and the variance of consumption growth.4
The concentrated-ownership model serves to magnify the variance of the capital owners￿con-
sumption growth relative to aggregate consumption growth, thereby generating a much larger
equity premium with reasonable levels of risk aversion.
Under power utility with a risk aversion coe¢ cient of 3.5, the concentrated-ownership
model can roughly match the ￿rst and second moments of key asset pricing variables in long-
run U.S. data over the period 1900 to 2008. For the baseline calibration, the equity premium
relative to one-period bonds is 5.6% in the model versus around 7% in the data. The equity
premium relative to long-term bonds is 2.6% in the model versus around 5% in the data.
Similar to Rudebusch and Swanson (2008), a long-term bond is modeled as a decaying-coupon
consol with a Macauly duration of 10 years. The model￿ s much smaller equity premium relative
to long-term bonds re￿ ects the fact that long-term bonds behave too much like equity￿ a result
that can also occur in endowment economies.5 The model does a good job of matching the
high volatility of equity returns in the data, but somewhat overpredicts the volatility of long-
term bond returns, again because these bonds behave too much like equity. When the model
is calibrated to match the lower post-World War II volatilities of dividend and consumption
growth, the risk aversion coe¢ cient must be increased to 7.5 for the model to deliver an equity
premium near 6% relative to one-period bonds.
Since labor supply is inelastic, capital owners must only decide the fraction of their avail-
able income to be devoted to investment, with the remaining fraction devoted to consumption.
Using a power-function approximation of the true non-linear model, I derive an approxi-
3Furlanetto and Seneca (2010) explicitly distinguish between depreciation shocks, capital quality shocks,
and investment shocks.










= ￿Var[log(ct+1=ct)]; where R
s
t+1 is the gross return on
equity, R
b
t+1 is the gross return on a one-period discount bond (the risk free rate), and ￿ is the coe¢ cient of
relative risk aversion. For the derivation, see Abel (1994, p. 353).
5See, for example, Abel (2008), Table 2.
2mate analytical solution of the capital owner￿ s decision rule which determines the investment-
consumption ratio as a function of the existing capital stock and the two stochastic shocks.
Making use of this decision rule, I derive approximate analytical expressions for the mean
and variance of the equilibrium asset returns. I plot the moments of the equilibrium returns
as functions of key model parameters. In simulations, the return moments generated by the
non-linear model are close to those predicted by the approximate analytical solution.
In addition to the risk aversion coe¢ cient, I investigate the impact of two other curvature
parameters, namely, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in the produc-
tion of aggregate output, and the elasticity of substitution between existing capital and new
investment in the production of new capital. In both cases, lower elasticities (implying more
curvature) imply higher costs of adjustment of the capital stock in response to shocks, which
in turn lowers the mean return on equity as well its volatility, while holding constant the
volatilities of dividend growth and aggregate consumption growth. The analytical moment
expressions further reveal that about 45% of the model equity premium relative to one-period
bonds is attributable to the investment shock while the remaining 55% is attributable to the
productivity shock. In contrast, about 95% of the model equity premium relative to long-term
bonds is attributable to the productivity shock.
On the macro side, the model performs reasonably well in matching the business cycle
moments of aggregate variables, including the pro-cyclical behavior of capital￿ s share of total
income in U.S. data. In the concentrated-ownership model, capital￿ s share of total income
di⁄ers from the capital owners￿share of total income to the extent that capital owners derive
some income from wages. The pro-cyclical movement of capital￿ s share in the model derives
from the production technology for output, where the elasticity of capital-labor substitution
is below unity, consistent with direct empirical estimates from U.S. data.
In response to a positive productivity shock, consumption, investment, dividends, and the
equity price all increase relative to the no-shock trend. In contrast, a positive investment shock
causes investment to increase, but at the expense of consumption and dividends which both
decline. The decline in dividends leads to drop in the equity price. In simulations when both
shocks are present, the growth rates of consumption, investment, dividends, and the equity
price remain procyclical, consistent with data.
1.2 Related Literature
The model developed here is most closely related to Danthine and Donaldson (2002) who also
employ a setup with capital owners and workers.6 In their model, workers are not paid their
marginal product but instead enter into long-term wage contracts with capital owners. The
wage contract is designed to smooth workers￿consumption streams by providing insurance
against aggregate shocks, a mechanism they describe as ￿operational leverage.￿A persistent
6Further elaboration on the Danthine-Donaldson model can be found in Danthine et al. (2008).
3shock to the relative bargaining power of the two groups creates an additional source of risk
that must be borne by the capital owners and contributes to a higher equity premium. Due to
the insurance mechanism, capital￿ s share of total income in the model is pro-cyclical despite
the Cobb-Douglas production technology. When the bargaining power shocks are positively
correlated with (temporary) productivity shocks, the model can produce an equity premium
relative to one-period bonds close to 6%, but the result is accompanied by too much volatility
in the one-period bond return, i.e., a standard deviation in excess of 10 percent. Another
drawback is the lack of independent empirical evidence that bargaining power shocks are an
important source of macroeconomic ￿ uctuations at business cycle frequencies. In contrast,
there is considerable evidence to suggest the importance of investment shocks or depreciation
shocks as a source of business cycle ￿ uctuations.
Guvenen (2009) also develops a model with concentrated ownership of capital. Stockhold-
ers price equity while non-stockholders price one-period bonds. As buyers of the one-period
bonds, non-stockholders have a very low elasticity of intertemporal substitution which makes
them heavily dependent on the bond market to smooth their consumption, thereby producing
a low equilibrium bond return, i.e., a low risk free rate. As sellers of the bonds, stockholders
have a high elasticity of intertemporal substitution coupled with a relatively high risk aversion
coe¢ cient equal to 6. Stockholders must bear the risk of countercyclical interest payments
to non-stockholders which ampli￿es the volatility of the stockholders￿consumption streams,
thereby raising their required rate of return on equity.7 For the baseline model with inelastic
labor supply, Guvenen￿ s model delivers an equity premium relative to one-period bonds of
about 5.5%, but he does not investigate the model￿ s implications for long-term bonds. It is
not clear how long-term bonds would be priced in Guvenen￿ s model, since it appears that both
types of agents would be willing to buy these bonds.
De Grave et al. (2010) develop a model that combines elements from both Danthine and
Donaldson (2002) and Guvenen (2009). They allow for three types of agents, all with elas-
tic labor supply: stockholders who price equity and long-term bonds, bondholders who price
one-period bonds, and workers who do not save. They ￿nd that the stockholder-bondholder
interaction from the Guvenen model is much less e⁄ective in generating a large equity pre-
mium when the model also includes the stockholder-worker wage bargaining shocks from the
Danthine-Donaldson model. De Grave et al. assume that while one-period bonds are priced
by the bondholders, long-term bonds are priced by the stockholders￿ a setup that seems hard
to justify. An important limitation of all the foregoing models is that they abstract from long-
run growth￿ a feature that a⁄ects the change in consumption from one period to the next. In
contrast, the model developed here is calibrated to match both the mean and volatility of per
capita consumption growth in long-run U.S. data.
Christiano and Fischer (2003 ) and Papanikolaou (2010) examine the asset pricing implica-
7Guo (2004) develops a similar mechanism in the context of an endowment economy.
4tions of investment speci￿c technological change in two sector models where the ￿investment
shock￿ is a geometric random walk with drift that drives growth in the investment goods-
producing sector. In contrast, the investment shock in this paper is a stationary disturbance
that closely resembles a depreciation shock. Finally, given the importance of the invest-
ment/depreciation shock in generating a sizeable equity premium in this paper, it is worth
noting the connection with Barro (2009) who introduces two types of depreciation shocks￿ one
representing normal ￿ uctuations and the other representing rare disasters that destroy a signif-
icant fraction of the capital stock. In this paper, a positive investment/depreciation shock can
be viewed as subjecting physical capital to a kind of ￿mini-disaster risk￿from technological
obsolescence.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, I describe the model and the
approximate analytical solution. I then describe the calibration procedure and investigate
the model￿ s quantitative properties. Speci￿cally, I examine the sensitivity of the equilibrium
return moments to changes in key model parameters. Next, using numerical simulations of the
nonlinear model, I show that the model can match numerous quantitative features of long-run
U.S. data. An appendix provides details on the model solution technique.
2 Model
The model consists of workers, capital owners, and competitive ￿rms. There are n times more
workers than capital owners, with the total number of capital owners normalized to one. The
￿rms are owned by the capital owners. Workers and capital owners both supply labor to the
￿rms inelastically, but in di⁄erent amounts.
2.1 Workers
Workers are assumed to incur a transaction cost for saving or borrowing small amounts which
prohibits their participation in ￿nancial markets. As a result, workers simply consume their
labor income each period such that
cw
t = wt ‘w
t ;
where cw
t is the individual worker￿ s consumption, wt is the competitive market wage, and
‘w
t = ‘w is the constant supply of labor hours per worker.
2.2 Capital Owners
























t + wt ‘c
t; (2)
where Et represents the mathematical expectation operator, ￿ is the subjective time discount
factor, ct is the individual capital owner￿ s consumption, and ￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion (the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution). When ￿ = 1; the
within-period utility function can be written as log(ct=Ht): Along the lines of Abel (1999), an
individual capital owner derives utility from consumption relative to an exogenously-growing
living standard index Ht = exp(￿t); where ￿ is the economy￿ s trend growth rate. This setup
implies that capital owners today are not substantially ￿happier￿ (as measured in utility
terms) than they were a hundred years ago because happiness is measured relative to an
ever-improving living standard. Unlike habit formation models such as Jermann (1998) and
Campbell and Cochrane (1999), the presence of Ht in the utility function here does not alter
the interpretation of ￿ as the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. The net e⁄ect of Ht is
to change the e⁄ective time discount factor which turns out to be useful in the calibration
procedure.8
Capital owners derive labor income in the amount wt ‘c
t; where ‘c
t = ‘c is the constant
supply of labor hours per person. Capital owners may purchase the ￿rm￿ s equity shares in
the amount qs
t+1 at the ex-dividend price ps
t: Shares purchased in the previous period yield
a dividend dt: One-period discount bonds purchased in the previous period yield a single
payo⁄ of one consumption unit per bond. Capital owners may also purchase long-term bonds
(consols) in the amount qc
t+1 at the ex-coupon price pc
t. A long-term bond purchased in period
t yields the following stream of decaying coupon payments (measured in consumption units)
starting in period t+1: 1; ￿; ￿2; :::; where ￿ is the decay parameter that governs the Macauly
duration of the bond, i.e., the present-value weighted average maturity of the bond￿ s cash
￿ ows.9 When ￿ = 0; the long-term bond collapses to a one-period bond. Equity shares are
assumed to exist in unit net supply while both types of bonds exist in zero net-supply. Market
clearing therefore implies qs
t = 1 and qb
t = qc
t = 0 for all t:
The capital owner￿ s ￿rst-order conditions with respect to qs
t+1; qb
t+1; and qc
t+1 are as follows:
ps


























8The value of ￿ is chosen to match the mean price-dividend ratio in long-run U.S. data. The presence of Ht
allows the calibration target to be achieved with ￿ < 1; even if risk aversion is high
9Rudebusch and Swanson (2008) employ a similar setup except that a long-term bond purchased in period
t yields a declining coupon stream of 1; ￿; ￿
2::: starting in period t rather than in period t + 1:
6where ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ and I have made the substitution (Ht+1=Ht)
￿(1￿￿) = exp(￿￿￿). In equi-
librium, the capital owner￿ s budget constraint becomes ct = dt + wt ‘c; which shows that the
capital owner￿ s consumption is funded from dividends and wage income.
2.3 Firms

















￿y 2 (0; 1)
(6)






with z0 given. The symbol kt is the ￿rm￿ s stock of physical capital and zt is a labor-augmenting
￿productivity shock￿that evolves as a random walk with drift. The drift parameter ￿ deter-
mines the trend growth rate of output. The total labor input is given by ‘c
t + n‘w
t . The
parameter  y depends on the elasticity of substitution ￿y between capital and labor in pro-
duction. When ￿y = 1 (or  y = 0), we recover the usual Cobb-Douglas production technology.
When ￿y ! 0 (or  y ! ￿1), the production technology takes a Leontief formulation such
that capital and labor become perfect compliments. When ￿y ! 1 (or  y ! 1), capital and
labor become perfect substitutes.
Resources devoted to investment augment the ￿rm￿ s stock of physical capital according to
the law of motion
kt+1 = B
h
(1 ￿ ￿t) k
 k

















with k0 and v0 given. The parameter  k depends on the elasticity of substitution ￿k be-
tween existing capital and new investment in the production of new capital. As ￿k ! 0 (or
 k ! ￿1), the implicit cost of adjusting the capital stock from one period to the next in-
creases.10 A temporary but persistent ￿investment shock￿vt changes the relative importance
of new investment versus existing capital in the production of new capital. As noted in the in-
troduction, this shock can also be interpreted as a capital quality shock, a depreciation shock,
or more generally, a ￿nancial friction that a⁄ects the supply of new capital. Starting from the
above speci￿cation, we can recover the basic linear law of motion with no adjustment costs
and a constant depreciation rate b ￿ by imposing the following parameter settings: ￿k = 1;
￿ = 1=(2 ￿b ￿); B = 2 ￿b ￿; and ￿2
u = 0:
10Kim (2003) shows that the intertemporal adjustment cost speci￿cation (8) can also be interpreted as a
multisectoral adjustment cost that imposes a nonlinear transformation between consumption and investment
in the national income identity.
7Under the assumption that the labor market is perfectly competitive, ￿rms take wt as
given and choose sequences of ‘c
t+j + n‘w
t+j and kt+1+j; to maximize the following discounted

















subject to the production function (6) and the law of motion for capital (8). Firms act in
the best interests of their owners such that dividends in period t + j are discounted using the
capital owner￿ s stochastic discount factor Mt+j ￿ ￿j exp(￿￿￿j)(ct+j=ct)
￿￿ :



















































which re￿ ect the constant labor supplies ‘c and ‘w: Equation (11) shows that labor is paid its
marginal product. The symbol sk






represents labor￿ s share. When ￿y = 1 (or  y = 0), we have the Cobb-Douglas
case where sk
t = ￿: Comparing the ￿rst-order condition (12) to the equity pricing equation (3),
we see that the ex-dividend price of an equity share is given by ps
t = it g(kt+1=kt; vt): The
equity share is a claim to a perpetual stream of dividends dt+1 = sk
t+1 yt+1 ￿ it+1 starting in
period t + 1:11
2.4 Approximate Analytical Solution
To facilitate a solution for the equilibrium allocations, the ￿rst-order condition (12) must be
rewritten in terms of stationary variables. Since labor supply is inelastic, the combined entity
of the ￿rm and capital owner must only decide the fraction of available income to be devoted to
11After taking the derivitive of the pro￿t function (10) with respect to kt+1; I have multiplied both sides of
the resulting ￿rst-order condition by kt+1; which is known at time t:
8investment, with the remaining fraction devoted to consumption. If we de￿ne the investment-
consumption ratio as xt ￿ it=ct, then the economy￿ s resource constraint yt = ct +ncw
t +it can





























t is the capital owners￿share of total income, given below. De￿ning the normalized




































t if capital owners do not work such that ‘c = 0: Equation (18) implies
@sk
t=@kn;t < 0 when ￿y < 1 such that  y < 0: Capital￿ s share of total income will therefore
move in the opposite direction as the normalized capital stock kn;t if the elasticity of capital-
labor substitution is below unity, as in the baseline calibration. A positive innovation to the
productivity shock will raise zt and thus lower kn;t producing pro-cyclical movement in sk
t:
A positive innovation to the investment shock will also lower kn;t and hence raise sk
t because
the investment shock is similar to a depreciation shock that erodes the capital stock kt: Since
labor supply is ￿xed, the cyclical behavior of sc
t will be very similar to that of sk
t:
Using the de￿nition of kn;t and equation (8), the law of motion for the normalized capital
stock is
kn;t+1 = B exp(￿zt+1 + zt) kn;t
(









where the ratios it=yt and yt=kt are given by equations (15) and (17). Similarly, the function
















An expression for the capital owner￿ s consumption growth in terms of stationary variables



















exp(zt+1 ￿ zt) (22)
Substituting these various expressions into equation (12) together with the capital owners￿
resource constraint yt+1 = (ct+1 + it+1)=sc
t+1 yields the following transformed version of the
￿rst-order condition in terms of stationary variables:































where I have made use of zt+1￿zt = ￿+"t+1: Notice that the term involving exp(￿￿￿) in the
original ￿rst-order condition (12) has dropped out, leaving only ￿ in the transformed version.
There is a single decision variable xt and two state variables, kn;t and vt;with corresponding
laws of motion given by equations (20) and (9).
To facilitate an analytical solution, both sides of the transformed ￿rst-order condition are
approximated as power functions around the points e x = expfE [log(xt)]g; e kn = expfE [log(kn;t)]g;

















exp(b3 vt+1 + ￿"t+1); (24)
where ai and bi; i = 0;1;2;3 are Taylor series coe¢ cients that depend on both e x and e kn:
Similarly, the law of motion for the normalized capital stock (20) can be approximated as








exp[f3 vt ￿ "t+1] (25)
where fi; i = 1;2;3 are Taylor series coe¢ cients. The approximate solution is given by the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. An approximate analytical solution for the capital owner￿ s investment-
consumption ratio is given by






10where e x = expfE [log(xt)]g and e kn = expfE [log(kn;t)]g are the approximation points and
￿k and ￿v are given by the solutions to
(b1f1)￿2
k + (b1f2 + b2f1 ￿ a1)￿k + b2f2 ￿ a2 = 0;
￿v =
￿b3 + f3 (b1￿k + b2) ￿ a3
a1 ￿ ￿b1 ￿ f1 (b1￿k + b2)
;
provided jf1￿k + f2j < 1:
Proof : See Appendix A.
The quadratic equation for ￿k in Proposition 1 has two solutions. The condition jf1￿k + f2j <
1 selects the stationary root. Substituting the decision rule for xt into equation (25) yields
the following reduced-form law of motion for the normalized capital stock





exp[(f1￿k + f3) vt ￿ "t+1]; (26)
which shows that jf1￿k + f2j < 1 is needed for stationarity. Given the stochastic properties
of vt and "t+1; the above law of motion can be used to derive an analytical expression for
V ar[log(kn;t)]: The variance of the log investment-consumption ratio is then given by
V ar[log(xt)] = (￿k)
2 V ar[log(kn;t)] + (￿v)
2 V ar(vt) + 2￿k￿vCov [log(kn;t); vt]: (27)








exp[h2 vt + h3 ut+1 + h4 "t+1]; (28)
where hi; i = 1;2;3;4 are Taylor series coe¢ cients. The above equation can be used to derive
an analytical expression for V ar[log(ct+1=ct)]:
Later, in the model simulations, I demonstrate that the approximate analytical solution
yields results which are close to those generated by an alternate solution method that pre-
serves the model￿ s nonlinear equilibrium conditions and employs a version of the parameterized
expectation algorithm (PEA) described by Den Haan and Marcet (1990).
2.5 Asset Pricing Variables
Given the equilibrium relationships ps
t = it gn (xt; kn;t; vt); dt = sk
t yt￿it; and yt = (ct + it)=sc
t;
it is straightforward to derive the following expressions for the equity price-dividend ratio and





































xt gn (xt; kn;t; vt)
#
; (30)
where ct+1=ct is given by equation (22). After making the appropriate substitutions, the price-
dividend ratio can be approximated as a power function of the state variables kn;t and vt; while
the equity return can be approximated as a power function of kn;t; vt; ut+1; and "t+1:
The remaining asset pricing variables are the one-period bond return Rb
t+1 (the risk free
rate) and the long-term bond return Rc






























The conditional expectation in equation (31) can be computed analytically using the approx-
imate version of ct+1=ct in equation (28). The price of the long-term bond pc
t must computed
separately as the solution to the ￿rst-order condition (5). Proceeding along the same lines as
the solution for xt; the ￿rst-order condition (5) can be approximated as
pc
























where I have substituted in the approximate expression for ct+1=ct from equation (28). The
approximation point is e pc = expfE [log(pc
t)]g and bc
1 = ￿e pc=(1 + ￿e pc) is a Taylor series
coe¢ cient. The approximate analytical solution takes the form
pc








where the consol pricing coe¢ cients ￿c
k and ￿c
v depend on the investment-consumption decision
rule coe¢ cients ￿k and ￿v from Proposition 1.
12Using power function approximations of the returns de￿ned by equations (30), (31), and









= ￿log(￿) + ￿ ￿ 1
2 (b1￿v + b3)
2 ￿2
u ￿ 1



































Di⁄erences in the mean log returns across assets are comprised of two parts; one part de-
pends on the volatility of the investment shock innovation while the other part depends on the
volatility of the productivity shock innovation.12 The power function approximations of the re-






















: Given the ￿rst and second moments of the log returns, the uncondi-
tional moments of Rs
t+1; Rb
t+1; and Rc
t+1 can be computed analytically by making use of the
properties of the log-normal distribution.13
3 Model Calibration
A time period in the model is taken to be one year. The baseline parameters are chosen
simultaneously to match various empirical targets, as summarized in Table 1. The analytical
moment formulas derived from the log-linear approximate solution of the model are used as
starting points for the nonlinear model calibration. A process of trial and error is used to
select the parameter values which are used for the nonlinear model simulations.
12If the exogenous living standard index Ht is omitted from the utility function (1), then the constant term
￿ in the mean log return expressions would be replaced by ￿￿; where ￿ is the risk aversion coe¢ cient. When
Ht is present, the net e⁄ect is equivalent to employing a larger value of ￿ for ￿ > 1:







V ar(Rt) = E (Rt)
2 fexp(V ar[log(Rt)]) ￿ 1g:







n 9 9 Capital owners = top income decile
‘c
‘c+n‘w 0:063 0:061 Mean sc
t = 0:4; income share of top decile
￿ 0:836 0:801 Mean sk
t = 0:36; capital￿ s share of income
￿ 3:5 3:5 Mean equity premium ’ 6 %
￿y 0:55 0:55 Empirical estimates: 0.4 - 0.6
￿k 0:45 0:45 Std. dev. equity return ’ 20 %
B 1:071 1:078 Mean kt=yt = 2:8
￿ 0:0029 0:0032 Mean it=yt = 0:22
￿ 0:0203 0:0203 Mean consumption growth = 2.03 %
￿" 0:0558 0:0564 Std. dev. consumption growth = 3.51 %
￿u 0:2909 0:2584 Std. dev. dividend growth = 11.7 %







￿ 0:9518 0:9519 Mean ps
t=dt = 26:6
￿ 0:9650 0:9648 Consol duration = 10 years
The number of workers per capital owner is set to n = 9 so that capital owners represent
the top income decile of households in the model economy. At the baseline calibration, capital
owners supply 6 percent of the total labor input so that the top income decile in the model
earns 40 percent of total income on average, consistent with the long-run average income
share measured by Piketty and Saez (2003). I investigate the sensitivity of the results to
changing the trend value e sc = expfE [log(sc
t)]g; which is adjusted by changing the relative
magnitudes of ‘c and ‘w: When ‘w = 0; we have sc
t = 1 for all t and the model collapses to
a representative agent framework. When ‘c = 0; we have sc
t = sk
t for all t and we have the
basic capitalist-worker framework employed by Judd (1985), Lansing (1999), and others. The
production function parameter ￿ is chosen so that the average value of capital￿ s share of total
income in the model matches the corresponding U.S. average.14 Table 2 compares the model
distribution for income and wealth to the corresponding distribution in the U.S. economy.
The U.S. ￿nancial wealth distribution data are from Wol⁄ (2006), covering the period 1983 to
2001. The Gini coe¢ cient data for income are from Heathcote et al. (2010) using the Current
Population Survey for the period 1967 to 2005.
14Capital￿ s share of total income is de￿ned as 1￿ labor￿ s share, where labor￿ s share for the period 1947 to
2008 is obtained from <www.bls.gov/data>, series ID PRS85006173.
14Table 2: Income and Wealth Distribution: Data versus Model









0.32 - 0.423 0.30
Gini coe¢ cient
Financial wealth
0.89 - 0.932 0.90
Sources: 1 = Piketty and Saez (2003), 2 = Wol⁄ (2006), 3 = Heathcote et al. (2010).
The parameters ￿; ￿y; and ￿k each govern an aspect of curvature in the model. The
baseline risk aversion coe¢ cient ￿ = 3:5 is chosen to achieve an equity premium relative
to one-period bonds close to 6 percent. The baseline value of the capital-labor substitution
elasticity is ￿y = 0:55. Chirinko (2008) reviews the many studies that have attempted to
estimate this parameter using various econometric methods. He concludes that ￿the weight
of the evidence suggests a value of [the elasticity parameter] in the range of 0:40￿0:60.￿The
baseline value of the capital￿ investment substitution elasticity is ￿k = 0:45: In conjunction
with the other parameters, this value delivers an empirically plausible volatility for the model￿ s
equity return. I examine the sensitivity of the results to changes in ￿; ￿y; and ￿k:
The volatility of the productivity shock innovation ￿" is chosen so that the model matches
the standard deviation of real per capita consumption growth in long-run annual U.S. data.
The volatility of the investment shock innovation ￿u is chosen so that the model matches
the standard deviation of dividend growth for the S&P 500 stock index.15 I examine the
sensitivity of the results to changes in the magnitude of both ￿" and ￿u: I also examine the
implications of calibrating the model to match the post-World War II volatilities of dividend
and consumption growth.16
The parameter ￿ is set so that the Macauly duration of the long-term bond is D = 10
years. The Macauly duration is the present-value-weighted average maturity of the bond￿ s














1 ￿ f M ￿
; (38)
where f M is the trend stochastic discount factor de￿ned as f M = exp[E log(Mt+1)] = ￿ exp(￿￿):
15The series for real stock prices, real dividends, and real per capita consumption employed in the paper
are from Robert Shiller￿ s website <http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/>. The price-dividend ratio in year t is
de￿ned as the value of the S&P 500 stock index at the beginning of year t + 1; divided by the accumulated
dividend over year t:
16For the period 1947 to 2008, the standard deviation of real dividend growth is 5.4% while the standard
deviation of real per capita consumption growth is 1.75%.
154 Quantitative Results
4.1 Impulse Response Functions
Figure 2 plots the model response to a one standard error innovation of the productivity
shock (blue line) and the investment shock (red line). The responses are computed using the
solution of the nonlinear model which is outlined in Appendix B. In both cases, the ￿gure
shows the percentage deviation from the no-shock trend. The e⁄ects of the productivity shock
innovation are permanent due to the unit root in the law of motion (7), whereas the e⁄ects of
the investment shock are temporary, but very persistent.
An important distinction between the two shocks is that a positive productivity shock
expands the amount of available output that can be used to increase both consumption and
investment. In contrast, a positive investment shock serves to increase investment at the
expense of consumption. The investment shock is very similar to a depreciation shock, as
discussed in more detail later. A positive investment shock temporarily erodes the capital
stock relative to the no-shock trend which in turn reduces output relative to no-shock trend.
The capital owner￿ s consumption recovers more quickly than the worker￿ s consumption because
a positive investment shock temporarily boosts the capital owner￿ s share of total income sc
t:
This is so because both sc
t and sk
t move in the opposite direction as the normalized capital
stock kn;t when ￿y < 1 such that  y < 0: Despite the drops in capital and total output, the
capital owners￿share of that output rises, which serves to accelerate the recovery of the capital
owners￿consumption relative to the workers￿consumption.
The e⁄ect of the two shocks on asset prices is also very di⁄erent. A positive productivity
shock allows for a permanent increase in dividends which permanently raises the equity price.
Bond prices also increase to satisfy the no-arbitrage condition across the di⁄erent asset classes.
In contrast, a positive investment shock stimulates investment temporarily, but since output is
reduced (due to the erosion of the capital stock), there are now less resources to pay dividends,
so dividends must be reduced for a time. The reduction in dividends temporarily lowers the
equity price. Bond prices also decline to satisfy the no-arbitrage condition. This feature of
the model is consistent with empirical evidence that the stock market reacts negatively to
technology innovations that accelerate the obsolescence of existing capital (see Hobijn and
Jovanovic, 2001).
As the investment shock dissipates, the level of investment returns to the no shock-trend
while both dividends and the equity price recover upwards, but then slightly overshoot the
no-shock trend. The overshooting occurs because a positive investment shock boosts capital￿ s
share of total income sk
t in a persistent manner, thus providing some additional resources from
which to pay dividends. The fact that a temporary investment shock can induce a large move
in the equity price helps the model to match the volatility of equity returns in U.S. data.
However, as we shall see in the simulations, the volatility of the model price-dividend ratio is
16still below the volatility observed in the data.
4.2 Sensitivity of Return Moments to Key Parameters
Figures 3 and 4 plot the mean and standard deviation of the asset returns as key parameters
are varied. A vertical line in each panel marks the baseline value for each parameter being
examined. The return moments are computed using the approximate analytical solution of the
model. The approximate log-linear solution employs a slightly di⁄erent baseline calibration for
the parameters ￿; B; ￿; ￿"; and ￿u; as shown in Table 1. This is done so that the approximate
solution matches the same empirical targets as the nonlinear model.
For the ￿rst four cases, when a given parameter is changed, the remaining non-curvature
parameters are adjusted to maintain the same empirical targets. The three curvature parame-
ters ￿; ￿y; and ￿k are maintained at their baseline values except when they are the subject of
a particular sensitivity experiment. In the ￿nal two cases, the standard deviation of a shock
innovation is being varied. In these instances, when ￿" is being varied, I hold ￿u constant at
its baseline value and vice versa when ￿u is being varied. Hence for these two plots only, the
model does not match the volatilities of U.S. consumption and dividend growth growth except
at the baseline calibration.
The top two panels in Figure 3 show the e⁄ect of changing the trend value of the capital
owners￿share of total income, i.e., e sc = expfE [log(sc
t)]g: At the extreme right we have
e sc = 1 which is achieved by setting ‘w = 0 so that the model collapses to a representative-
agent framework. At the extreme left, we have e sc = e sk = 0:36 which is achieved by setting
‘c = 0 so that the model coincides with a basic capitalist-worker framework. Intermediate
values of e sc are obtained by varying the ratio ‘c=(‘c + n‘w):17 Starting from e sc = 1 at the
extreme right, we see that the representative-agent version of the model yields a small equity
premium and a low volatility of equity returns. Papanikolaou (2010) also obtains a small
equity premium in a representative-agent model with nonstationary investment shocks.
As e sc declines towards the lower bound of e sk = 0:36; the equity premium relative to
the one-period bond increases dramatically and the return volatilities for all assets increase.
The intuition is straightforward: a decline in e sc implies that a higher proportion of the capital
owners￿consumption is funded from dividends rather than wage income. Since dividend growth
is about three times more volatile than aggregate consumption growth (in both the model and
the data), the capital owners demand a higher rate of return on equity to compensate for the
risk of linking their consumption stream to volatile dividends. The return on the one-period
bond actually declines with e sc due to the capital owners￿precautionary saving motive which
causes them to bid up the price of the bond. At the baseline calibration with e sk = 0:40 and
e sk = 0:36; the model produces an equity premium relative to one-period bonds that is close to
6 percent and an equity return volatility of about 20 percent. Both ￿gures are close to those
17Speci￿cally, I vary ‘
c between 0 and 1 with ‘
w = 1 ￿ ‘
c:
17in the data. But as noted in the introduction, the equity premium relative to the consol bond
is much smaller, only around 3 percent, since these bonds behave too much like equity in this
framework.
The middle panel of Figure 3 shows the e⁄ect of increasing the risk aversion coe¢ cient ￿: At
the extreme left when ￿ = 0; capital owners are risk neutral and the equity premium relative
to both types of bonds is zero. Moreover, since the stochastic discount factor is constant when
￿ = 0; the return volatility of the bonds is also zero. As risk aversion increases, the mean
return on equity increases rapidly while the mean return on one-period bonds actually declines,
again due to the capital owners￿precautionary saving motive. The mean return on the consol
initially declines a bit with risk aversion (due to the precautionary saving motive) but then
starts increasing with risk aversion but at a slower rate than the equity return. The return
volatilities all increase with risk aversion because the stochastic discount factor becomes more
variable, thus increasing the volatility of the equilibrium asset prices.
The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows the e⁄ect of changing the substitution elasticity
between capital and labor in production. At the extreme right when ￿y = 1; the production
function is Cobb-Douglas such that sk
t = ￿ for all t: Empirical estimates for ￿y are in the
range of 0.4 to 0.6. As ￿y declines, the curvature of the production technology increases, while
holding ￿xed the volatilities of dividend growth and aggregate consumption growth. The
￿gure shows that changes in ￿y have only a mild e⁄ect on return moments over most of the
range examined. However, at the extreme left when ￿y approaches a value of 0.5, the e⁄ect on
return moments is more pronounced. In this region of the parameter space, more curvature
in the production function serves to lower the mean and volatility of the equity return, with
the e⁄ect of shrinking the equity premium relative to one-period bonds. A smaller value of
￿y e⁄ectively imposes a higher cost of adjusting the capital stock in response to shocks, which
makes equity appear less risky relative to the one-period bond.
The top panel of Figure 4 shows the e⁄ect of changing the substitution elasticity between
existing capital and new investment in the production of new capital. At the extreme right
when ￿k = 1; the capital law of motion is Cobb-Douglas and the equity price can be represented
simply as ps
t = it=￿t: A smaller value of ￿k implies more curvature in the capital law of motion
while holding ￿xed the volatilities of dividend growth and aggregate consumption growth.
Similar to the e⁄ect of changing ￿y; a smaller value of ￿k reduces the mean and volatility of
the equity return and shrinks the equity premium relative to the one-period bond.
The middle panel of Figure 4 shows the e⁄ect of changing the standard deviation of the
productivity shock innovation ￿" while holding ￿u constant at the baseline value. Higher
values of ￿" raises the equity premium relative to both types of bonds. In particular, higher
values of ￿" stimulate precautionary saving which serves to reduce the required rate of return
on the one-period bond.
The bottom panel of Figure 4 shows the e⁄ect of changing the volatility of the invest-
18ment shock innovation ￿u while holding ￿" constant at its baseline value. As noted in the
introduction, the investment shock can be viewed as subjecting capital owners to a kind of
￿mini-disaster risk￿that boosts the required return on equity. Higher values of ￿u raise the
equity premium relative to the one-period bond, but the premium relative the consol bond is
little changed. As seen previously with the impulse response functions plotted in Figure 2, the
consol bond responds to the investment shock in much the same way as equity.
Using the analytical expressions for the mean log returns given by equations (35) through
(37), it is possible to decompose the equity premium into two parts, each attributable to one
of the two shock innovations.18 At the baseline calibration, 45 percent of the equity premium
relative to one-period bonds is attributable to the temporary investment shock, while 55
percent is attributable to the permanent productivity shock. In contrast, only 6 percent of the
equity premium relative to consols is attributable to the investment shock while 95 percent is
attributable to the productivity shock. The investment shock accounts for the high volatility
of the dividend stream which is a signi￿cant source of risk relative to the one-period bond.
The capital owner￿ s stochastic discount factor is strongly linked to dividend growth and hence
is strongly in￿ uenced by the investment shock. The consol bond comes with its own stream of
payments, the value of which is in￿ uenced by the variability of the stochastic discount factor.
The productivity shock is the main source of equity risk relative to the consol bond because
this shock a⁄ects the stochastic growth rate of the dividend stream. In contrast, the coupon
payments from the consol do not grow over time but rather decay at a constant rate.
4.3 Nonlinear Model Simulations
Figure 5 shows that there is close agreement between the log-linear approximate solution of
the model and the solution of the nonlinear model that employs the parameterized expectation
algorithm. Lansing (2010) demonstrates the accuracy of a very similar approximate solution
method by comparison to the exact solution in an endowment economy with autocorrelated
dividend growth.
Figure 6 demonstrates the similarity of the investment shock to a depreciation shock of
the sort considered by Liu et al. (2009). The ￿gure shows a scatterplot of gross capital growth
kt+1=kt versus the investment-capital ratio it=kt generated by a long simulation of the nonlinear
model. The top panel plots the mean relationship (in blue) between the two ratios by inserting
the mean value E (￿t) from the simulation into the capital law of motion (8). The dashed
lines show the corresponding shifts in the mean relationship from adding or subtracting one
standard deviation of ￿t from its mean value. The upward-sloping straight line (in red) is the
hypothetical relationship implied by a linear law of motion for capital with no adjustment costs
and a constant annual depreciation rate, i.e., kt+1=kt = 1￿b ￿+it=kt. The hypothetical constant
18Although the decomposition is computed using the expressions for the mean log returns in equations (35)
through (37), one can assume that a roughly similar decomposition holds for the mean returns which are plotted
in Figures 3 and 4.
19depreciation rate is computed from the simulation as b ￿ = 1 + E (it=kt) ￿ E (kt+1=kt) = 0:067:
The vertical intercept of the hypothetical relationship is 1￿b ￿ so that a model with stochastic
depreciation would imply a shifting vertical intercept of the straight line. Comparing the
slope of the straight line (equal to 1.0) to the slope of the mean relationship in the model
(equal to 0.82) shows that capital adjustment costs are relatively small on average, i.e., when
￿t = E (￿t) and it=kt = E (it=kt): The investment shock shifts the value of ￿t upwards or
downwards in a persistent manner, thus shifting the relationship between kt+1=kt and it=kt so
as to generate the cloud of points shown in the lower panel of Figure 6. A roughly similar cloud
of points could be generated by a model with no adjustment costs and stochastic variation in
the depreciation rate b ￿:
Table 3 presents unconditional moments of the model￿ s asset pricing variables computed
from a long simulation of the nonlinear model using the baseline parameter values shown in
Table 1. The table also shows the corresponding statistics from U.S. data.19 Figures 7 and 8
provide a visual comparison between the model and the data for selected variables.
Table 3: Unconditional Asset Pricing Moments
Variable Dates Statistic U.S. Data Model
ps
t=dt 1871-2008 Mean 26.6 27.0
Std. Dev. 13.8 5.24
Corr. Lag 1 0.93 0.86
Rs
t+1 ￿ 1 1900-2008 Mean 8.0% 8.0%
Std. Dev. 20.4% 21.7%
Corr. Lag 1 0.00 ￿0:04
Rb
t+1 ￿ 1 1900-2008 Mean 1.1% 2.4%
Std. Dev. 4.7% 6.0%
Corr. Lag 1 0.62 0.87
Rc
t+1 ￿ 1 1900-2008 Mean 2.6% 5.4%
Std. Dev. 10.0% 15.5%



















Note: Model results computed from a 20,000 period simulation.
Table 3 and the top panel of Figure 7 show that the model underpredicts the volatility
of the U.S. price-dividend ratio. The model standard deviation is about 5% versus almost
14% in the data. The volatility of the U.S. price-dividend ratio is in￿ uenced by a dramatic
bubble-like run-up starting in the mid-1990s that is mostly unwound by the end of the data
sample in 2008. A large literature ￿nds evidence that real-world stock prices exhibit ￿excess
19The U.S. real return data shown in Table 3 are for equity, long-term bonds, and short term bills, from
Dimson, et al. (2002), updated through 2008.
20volatility￿when compared to the discounted stream of ex post realized dividends.20 If ￿ndings
of excess volatility in the data are genuine, then one would not expect a fully rational model
like this one to be able to match the volatility of the U.S. price dividend ratio. An extension
of the present model that allows for boundedly-rational behavior on the part of capital owners
could potentially magnify the volatility of the price-dividend ratio, providing a better match
with the data.21
Despite underpredicting the volatility of the price-dividend ratio, the model provides a
good match with mean and volatility of the U.S. equity return, which are around 8% and 20%,
respectively. Recall that the later statistic is matched by construction due to the choice of the
curvature parameter ￿k in the capital law of motion (8). The model somewhat overpredicts
the mean and volatility of the U.S. short-term bond return, although it should be noted that
the return data constructed by Dimson, et al. (2002, updated) pertain to a 3-month ￿bill￿
whereas the short-term bond in the model has a one-year maturity. As noted previously,
the model￿ s long-term bond behaves too much like equity so the mean and volatility of the
consol are too high relative to the mean and volatility of the U.S. long-term bond return.
This de￿ciency in the model is well-summarized by the Sharpe ratio comparison shown at
the bottom of Table 3. Finally, the model does capture the fact that returns on equity and
long-terms bonds exhibit zero or weak autocorrelation in the data while returns on short-term
bonds exhibit strong positive autocorrelation.
Table 4 shows the results of model forecasting regressions that seek to predict either div-
idend growth or log equity returns using the lagged value of the log dividend yield (i.e., the
negative of the log price-dividend ratio). For comparison, the table shows results for similar
regressions employing U.S. stock market data as reported by Cochrane (2008) and Bansal
and Yaron (2011). Cochrane￿ s study employs per share measures of dividends and dividend
yields for a value-weighted portfolio over the period 1926 to 2004. Bansal and Yaron￿ s study
employs aggregate measures of stock market payouts and payout yields that re￿ ect changes
in the number of equity shares outstanding over the period 1929 to 2003. Cochrane ￿nds
that the estimated coe¢ cient in the predictive regression for dividend growth is much smaller
in magnitude than the coe¢ cient in the predictive regression for returns (bd = 0:008 versus
br = 0:097). This result implies that nearly all of the variablity in the U.S. dividend yield (or
the U.S. price-dividend ratio) is coming from changes in expected future returns as opposed
to changes in expected future dividend growth rates. In contrast, Bansal and Yaron ￿nd that
the estimated coe¢ cient in the dividend growth regression is larger in magnitude than the
coe¢ cient in the returns regression (bd = 0:23 versus br = 0:17). This result implies that
changes in expected future dividend growth are the main source of variability in the U.S.
dividend yield. The model regressions yield bd = 0:137 and br = 0:306: On the one hand,
the model￿ s estimated coe¢ cient in the returns regression is larger than the coe¢ cient in the
20Lansing and LeRoy (2010) provide a recent update on this literature.
21For an example along these lines, see Lansing (2011).
21dividend growth regression, along the lines of the Cochrane study. But on the other hand,
the model￿ s estimated coe¢ cient in the dividend growth regression remains sizable, along the
lines of the Bansal-Yaron study.
Table 4: Forecasting Regressions
U.S. Data1 U.S. Data2 Model




















Sources: 1 = Cochrane (2008), Table 1, p. 1534 and 2 = Bansal and Yaron (2007), Table 3, p. 28.
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Model regressions based on data from a 20,000 period simulation.
The bottom panel of Figure 7 shows that the model equity premium relative to one-period
bonds is procyclical, exhibiting a correlation coe¢ cient with output growth of 0.49 versus a
value of 0.19 in the data. Table 5 below shows that the model equity premium relative to
consol bonds exhibits a correlation coe¢ cient with output growth of 0.89. This result is con-
sistent with the ￿nding reported earlier that about 95 percent of the equity premium relative
to consol bonds is attributable to the productivity shock. The introduction of additional sto-
chastic disturbances that a⁄ect equity and bonds in a di⁄erential manner would help to reduce
the overly-procyclical nature of the model equity premium. One such example would be to
introduce stochastic variation in the parameter ￿ that governs the decay rate of the consol
coupon payments. Moreover, if movements in ￿ were countercyclical, this feature would make
the consol less risky relative to equity, thus helping to magnify the associated equity premium.
Figure 8 shows that asset returns in both the data and the model exhibit time-varying
means and volatilities. The time-varying behavior in the data suggests the presence of nonlin-
earities. The time-varying behavior in the model is endogenous, owing to the nonlinear nature
of the various functional forms and equilibrium conditions. In contrast, Bansal and Yaron
(2004) introduce exogenous time-varying volatility in the stochastic process for consumption
growth within an endowment economy.
Tables 5, 6, and 7 show that the model performs reasonably well in matching the business
cycle moments of aggregate macro variables.22 In Table 5, the model variables all exhibit
strong correlations with output growth￿ a typical feature of productivity-shock driven real
business cycle models.
22Data on per capita real GDP from 1870-2008 are from <www.global￿nancialdata.com>. Data on real
business ￿xed investment from 1929-2008 are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis/Haver Analytics.






￿log(yt) 1871-2008 1.00 1.00
￿log(ca
t) 1890-2008 0.53 0.94
￿log(dt) 1872-2008 0.22 0.73
￿log(it) 1930-2008 0.23 0.79
￿log(ps
t) 1872-2008 0.14 0.48
Rs
t+1 ￿ Rb
t+1 1900-2008 0.19 0.49
Rs
t+1 ￿ Rc
t+1 1900-2008 0.21 0.89
Note: Model results computed from a 20,000 period simulation.
In Table 6, the model underpredicts the volatility of output growth relative to aggregate
consumption growth given by ca
t = ct + ncw
t . This feature is attributable to the model￿ s
underprediction of investment growth volatility￿ about 7% in the model versus about 16% in
the data. Due to capital adjustment costs, investment growth in the model is only about 1.8
times more volatile than output growth, whereas investment growth in the data is about 3 times
more volatile than output growth. Barlevy (2004, p. 983) notes the di¢ culty of generating
su¢ cient investment volatility in real business cycle models with capital adjustment costs.
However, the model does a good job of predicting the volatility of equity price growth￿ about
20% in the model versus about 18% in the data.






￿log(yt) 1871-2008 5.28% 3.70%
￿log(ca
t) 1890-2008 3.51% 3.50%
￿log(dt) 1872-2008 11.7% 11.5%
￿log(ct) ￿ ￿ 9.03%
￿log(cw
t ) ￿ ￿ 2.52%
￿log(it) 1930-2008 16.2% 6.45%
￿log(ps





Note: Model results computed from a 20,000 period simulation.
The bottom row of Table 6 shows that the capital owners￿consumption growth is 3.58
times more volatile than the workers￿consumption growth. The source of the extra volatility
for capital owners is their heavy reliance on volatile dividends to fund consumption. The
procyclical behavior of capital￿ s share of total income sk
t (discussed below) implies that labor￿ s
share is countercyclical, which helps to smooth the consumption of the workers relative to
that of capital owners. In the model of Danthine and Donaldson (2002), the source of extra
volatility for capital owners is the wage contract which smoothes workers￿consumption at the
23expense of larger ￿ uctuations in capital owners￿consumption. In the version of their model
that delivers an equity premium approaching 6%, the capital owners￿consumption growth is
10 times more volatile than aggregate consumption growth.23 By comparison, Table 6 shows
that the capital owners￿consumption growth in the present model is only 2.6 times more
volatile than aggregate consumption growth. In the model of Guvenen (2009), the source
of extra volatility for stockholders is the bond market; stockholders make interest payments
to bondholders which smooths the bondholders￿consumption but magni￿es the volatility of
stockholders￿consumption. Guvenen￿ s model delivers a consumption growth volatility ratio
for stockholders relative to non-stockholders of 2.4. Citing several empirical studies, he argues
that measured volatility ratios in the range of 1.5 to 2.0 are likely to represent a lower bound
for the true ratio.
Malloy, et al. (2009) study consumption growth data for stockholders and non-stockholders
for the period 1982 to 2004.24 Using their data, the consumption growth volatility ratio for the
two groups is 1.63, as shown in bottom row of Table 5. The corresponding volatility ratio in
the model is more than twice as large at 3.58. The sample period 1982 to 2004 employed in the
study by Malloy, et al. falls within the so-called ￿Great Moderation￿era which is characterized
by relatively mild macroeconomic ￿ uctuations. In contrast, the model is calibrated to match
the volatility of observed dividend growth for the period 1872 to 2008, which includes the Great
Depression and other signi￿cant bear markets. These events likely magni￿ed the volatility of
stockholders￿consumption relative to non-stockholders￿consumption in the data.
Dividends are much less volatile in the post-World War II sample period as can be clearly
seen from Figure 1. It is still the case, however, that dividend growth is about three times more
volatile than aggregate consumption growth for the period 1947 to 200• 8. When the model
is calibrated to match the lower post-World War II volatilities of dividend and consumption
growth, the capital owner￿ s risk aversion parameter must be increased to ￿ = 7:5 for the model
to deliver an equity premium near 6% relative to one-period bonds. The value ￿ = 7:5 remains
within the plausible range of 0 to 10 considered by Mehra and Prescott (1985). There is no
theoretical reason to think that stock market investors would ignore the pre-World War II data.
The persistent memory of the pre-World War II data in the minds of investors could serve as
a key determinant of today￿ s equity premium. Along these lines, Cogley and Sargent (2008)
develop a model where agents￿ persistent beliefs about dividend and consumption growth
formed during the Great Depression contribute to a large equity premium.
Finally, Table 7 shows that the model captures the procyclical movement of capital￿ s share
of total income in U.S. data. However, capital￿ s share in the model is signi￿cantly more
volatile than the corresponding U.S. value for the period 1947 to 2008. Again, expanding the
sample period to include the Great Depression and other bear markets would likely magnify
23See Table 6, Panel A (p. 62) in Danthine and Donaldson (2002). They do not report the volatility of
consumption growth for workers.
24The data are available from <www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/vissing/htm/research1.htm>
24the volatility of capital￿ s share in the data. As noted earlier, the procyclical movement of
capital￿ s share in the model derives from the production technology for output, where the
capital-labor substitution elasticity ￿y is below unity. Intuitively, when ￿y < 1; the capital
stock and the e⁄ective labor input (‘c + n‘w)exp(zt) are compliments. This complementarity
allows capital to derive proportionally more bene￿ts from a positive realization of a labor￿
enhancing productivity shock. In contrast, when ￿y = 1; the bene￿ts of a positive productivity
shock are shared proportionally between inputs so that income shares remain constant.





Std. Dev. 0.015 0.056







Note: Model results computed from a 20,000 period simulation.
5 Conclusion
A long history of research since Mehra and Prescott (1985) has sought to develop models that
can account for the high mean and high volatility of observed equity returns relative to bond
returns. One branch of this research has focused on investigating modi￿cations to agents￿
preferences that govern attitudes towards risk or intertemporal substitution. Another branch
has focused on investigating changes to the structure of the cash ￿ ows that are priced by agents
in the model. This paper falls into the second category. The basic intuition for the results is
that capital owners demand a high equity premium to compensate for the risk of linking their
consumption to a highly volatile dividend stream. Dividend growth in U.S. data is about three
times more volatile than aggregate consumption growth. Since ownership of ￿nancial wealth
in the U.S. economy is highly concentrated at the extreme upper end, the owners of ￿nancial
wealth must bear a disproportionate share of the risk from ￿ uctuating dividends.
In the model, investment shocks, which are similar to depreciation shocks, in￿ uence the
volatility of dividend growth and thus contribute to both a large equity premium and the
high volatility of equity returns. The model can match many quantitative features of U.S.
data under rational expectations, but it notably underpredicts the volatility of the price-
dividend ratio and the volatility of investment growth. These de￿ciencies could potentially
be addressed by a richer model that allows for non-fundamental asset price movements which
empirical evidence suggests are present in real-world stock market data.
25A Appendix: Approximate Solution (Proposition 1)
Taking logarithms of both sides of the transformed ￿rst-order condition (23) and then applying
a ￿rst-order Taylor series approximation to each side yields equation (24). The Taylor-series
coe¢ cients are themselves functions of the approximation points e x; e kn; and e v = 0:




exp(￿v vt+1) is substituted
into the right-side of equation (24) together with the approximate law of motion (25) that
governs kn;t+1 and vt+1 = ￿vt + ut+1: After evaluating the conditional expectation and then
collecting terms, we have:
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which shows that the conjectured form is correct. Solving for the undetermined coe¢ cients
￿k and ￿v yields the expressions shown in Proposition 1.








2 (b1￿v + b3)
2 ￿2
u + 1




1 ￿ ￿ [1 ￿ (1 ￿ e sk=e sc)Q]exp
h
1
2 (b1￿v + b3)
2 ￿2
u + 1





1 = B exp(￿￿)
(
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿
￿
e sc e x






where Q ￿ 1 ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)B k
exp( k ￿)















n + 1 ￿ ￿
; e sc =
￿e k
 y







n + 1 ￿ ￿
:
Equation (A.2) is derived from equation (A.1) after substituting in the expressions for the
Taylor series coe¢ cients a0 and b0 and then canceling terms. Equation (A.3) is the law of
motion for the normalized capital stock (20) evaluated at the approximation point.
26B Appendix: Nonlinear Model Solution
The impulse response functions and quantitative simulations are generated using the solution
method outlined below that preserves the model￿ s nonlinear equilibrium conditions. The
method employs a version of the parameterized expectation algorithm (PEA) described by
Den Haan and Marcet (1990).
The transformed ￿rst-order condition (23) can be represented as:
f (xt; kn;t; vt) = Et h(xt+1; kn;t+1; vt+1; "t+1) (B.1)
where h(￿) is the nonlinear object to be forecasted. For purposes of constructing the conditional
expectation, the function h(￿) is approximated as
h(￿) ’ d0 [kn;t]
dk exp[dv vt + du ut+1 + d" "t+1]; (B.2)
where d0; dk; dv; du; and d" are regression coe¢ cients that are obtained by projecting the
nonlinear function h(￿) onto the form (B.2) during repeated simulations of the model, as
described below. The initial guesses for d0 through d" are determined analytically using the
approximate decision rule from Proposition 1, together with the power function approximations
(24) and (25).
Given a set of initial guesses for d0 through d"; a simulation is run where the conditional
expectation on the right side of (B.1) is constructed each period as
Et h(￿) = d0 [kn;t]
dk exp
h







Given the forecast Et h(￿), the nonlinear function (B.1) is solved each period for xt using a
nonlinear equation solver. The state variables kn;t and vt evolve according to the exact laws
of motion (20) and (9). During the simulation, realized values of the nonlinear function h(￿)
are constructed. At the end of the simulation, the realized values of h(￿) are projected onto
the form (B.2) to obtain new guesses for d0 through d". The simulation is then repeated using
the new guesses for d0 through d" with the same sequence of draws for the shock innovations
ut+1 and "t+1: The procedure is stopped when the guesses for d0 through d" do not change
from one simulation to the next.
An analogous procedure is used to construct the conditional expectations in the bond
pricing equations (4) and (5) to solve for pb
t and pc
t each period. Speci￿cally, the nonlinear
objects to be forecasted are approximated by power functions of the state variables and shock
innovations as follows:
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termined analytically using the approximate solution of the model. After each simulation,
new guesses for the regression coe¢ cients are obtained by projecting the realized values of
the nonlinear functions Mt+1 and ￿Mt+1 pc
t+1 onto the forms shown in (B.4) and (B.5) until
convergence is achieved.
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